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Abstract: The paper proposes a post-Keynesian framework to explain Tobin’s q behaviour in 
the long run. The theoretical basis is informed by the Cambridge corporate model originally 
proposed by Kaldor (1966), which is reinterpreted here as a theory for q. The core of the 
‘Kaldorian q theory’ is a negative long-run relation between q and growth rates, a negative 
relation between q and propensities to consume, and the fact that q can be different from 1 in 
the long-run equilibrium. We generalise this model through a medium-scale Stock-Flow 
Consistent (SFC) model, which introduces important post-Keynesian aspects missing in the 
Kaldorian model, such as endogenous money, a financial system and inflation. We extend the 
model to include a more realistic treatment of firms’ financial structure decisions and allow the 
interdependence between these decisions and dividend policy. Numerical simulations confirm 
that the original Kaldorian relations between q and growth rates and propensities to consume 
hold, but unlike the original model, in our model q is not independent of how firms finance 
their investment. We also confirm the possibility of q being different from 1 in the long-run. 
Finally, we contrast this ‘post-Keynesian q theory’ with the Miller-Modigliani dividend 
irrelevance proposition and the neoclassical investment and financial theory. It is shown that 
its validity depends crucially on the value taken by q: for q values different from 1 the 
proposition will not hold and dividend policy will be relevant for equity valuation. Therefore, 
post-Keynesian q theory stands against the main predictions of mainstream finance and 
constitutes an alternative for developing a macroeconomic theory for equity markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the ‘going price in the market for exchanging existing assets’ 
to their ‘replacement or reproduction cost’ (Tobin & Brainard, 1977).2 Since the seminal works 
of Brainard and Tobin (Brainard & Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969; Tobin & Brainard, 1977), Tobin’s q 
has become an important theoretical construct widely used both by financial practitioners to 
assess current stock market conditions (Montier, 2014a; Smithers, 2009) and by academics, 
who have used q as the main explanatory variable in investment functions (Hayashi, 1982). 
However, none of the two groups have offered an explanation of the movements of q through 
time: the first group has usually assumed mean-reversion for the q series (with no strong 
theoretical justification) while the second has been more interested in the role of q as an 
exogenous variable, not as an endogenous one. 
The present paper offers an alternative macroeconomic vision of q based on the ‘Cambridge 
corporate model’ developed by Kaldor and others in the 1960s and 1970s (Kaldor, 1966; 
Marris, 1972; Moore, 1975; Moss, 1978). The Cambridge corporate model was originally 
proposed as a solution for the Harrod-Domar knife-edge dilemma, where equity valuation (not 
technology, as in the neoclassical framework, nor income distribution, as in the original 
Cambridge model) was the adjusting variable that brought overall savings and investment in 
equilibrium. This model can be reinterpreted as a macroeconomic theory for the valuation of 
equity markets – i.e. as a theory explaining q. This new interpretation offers two important 
conclusions: first, it finds a negative long-run relationship at the macroeconomic level between 
growth rates and valuation ratios; this is in contrast to firm-level equity valuation models (e.g. 
dividend, residual income and free-cash-flow discounted models), which suggest the 
opposite.3 Second, the causality goes from investment and animal spirits to q, whereas the 
neoclassical model (Hayashi, 1982) stresses the importance of q on investment decisions.4 This 
simple Kaldorian framework has been able to explain remarkably well the experience of the 
last decades in developed countries, where lower growth rates have been associated with 
higher valuation ratios. However, the Kaldorian framework has at least two important 
shortcomings: first, it is based on a real economy framework without money where equities 
are the only financial asset (Davidson, 1968; Kregel, 1985) and, second, the modelling of firms’ 
                                                          
2 In fact, first person to propose this ratio at the macroeconomic level was Kaldor (1966), who called it the 
‘valuation ratio’. In this chapter, the words ‘Tobin’s q’ and ‘valuation ratio’ will be used interchangeably. 
3 The insight that higher growth rates lead to lower valuation ratios has profound implications both for policy 
makers and market participants. The importance of market valuations for policy makers have been argued in length 
in Smithers (2009), who argues that central bankers should pay more attention to financial market valuations and 
not exclusively price inflation. For market participants, it is useful to have an idea whether markets are ‘expensive’ 
or not. However, at the macro level, traditional fundamental equity valuation methods applied to the valuation of 
whole indices will not work if the Kaldorian insight applies – because these discounted cash-flows methods will tell 
you that higher growth rates should lead to higher valuations. 
4 Although Tobin and Brainard did not develop formally this reverse causation issue, they briefly hinted at this 
dependence of q on investment decisions; ‘We agree that q’s are partly endogenous variables, that investments can 
influence q’s as well as vice versa, and that the lags between exogenous changes in q and investment could be “long 
and variable”’ (Tobin & Brainard, 1990, p. 548). 
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financing decisions is simplistic in that it assumes fixed dividend payout and share issue ratio. 
In other words, dividend and financing decisions are made independent of financial market 
conditions. 
This paper generalises and extends the Kaldorian model to address these shortcomings. This 
will be done through a medium-scale SFC model, which allows for a more sophisticated 
treatment of the financial aspects of the economy with a richer asset-liability structure. Our 
model is a generalisation because it contains Kaldor’s key behavioural function but also 
includes some realistic features missing in the original model, such as endogenous money, 
financial markets, cost-push inflation, corporate leverage and fiscal and monetary policy. We 
thus address the first shortcoming. In terms of behavioural assumptions, the model follows 
established post-Keynesian theory, but we deviate in one important aspect. In contrast to the 
Kaldorian model and to the standard SFC literature (Godley & Lavoie, 2007; Dos Santos & 
Zezza, 2008; Le Heron & Mouakil, 2008; Van Treeck, 2008), we consider financing and dividend 
policy decisions as interdependent following Gordon (1992, 1994). We have endogenous 
dividend payout and share issuance and thus address the second shortcoming.  
The aim of the model is to demonstrate that post-Keynesian theory, using a reasonable set of 
assumptions, can offer a robust theoretical explanation for the behaviour of q over the long-
run. While our SFC model features both short-term and long-term dynamics, our focus is, like 
Kaldor’s, on long-run steady-state positions. Our modelling of short run dynamics remains 
minimalistic; in particular we bypass all the interesting asset price dynamics highlighted by the 
Minskyan theory of financial markets and behavioural finance (Thaler, 2005).5 We do so not 
because these issues would not be important – indeed they are – but because we argue that 
even in steady growth equilibrium without speculation or any other specific behavioural bias, 
post-Keynesian theory offers a distinct explanation of q. 
The main findings of our post-Keynesian model are as follows. First, the original two long-run 
relationships of the Kaldorian model, between q and growth rates and q and propensities to 
consume, hold. Second, in contrast to the Kaldorian model, simulations show that the way 
investment is financed matters, not only for q, but also for output, employment and prices. 
Finally, as in Kaldor’s, the level of q does not tend to 1 even in the long-run, contradicting thus 
the neoclassical q theory where the equilibrium level of q is 1. This last finding has far-reaching 
consequences for the Miller-Modigliani (M&M) dividend irrelevance proposition (Miller & 
Modigliani, 1961), which states that the value of a corporation is independent from its 
dividend policy. Although the theory was originally under attack by corporate finance theorists 
(Lintner, 1962; Gordon, 1963; Walter, 1963), now it is commonplace in finance and has been 
widely used as a micro-foundation for many neoclassical macro models.6 We show that the 
                                                          
5 For a discussion of a possible research agenda in common between post-Keynesian economics and behavioural 
finance, see Jefferson & King (2010).  
6 This is the case in most real-business cycle and new-Keynesian models. See, for instance, Christiano et al. (2005) 
and Smets & Wouters (2007). In these models, the institutional setup is irrelevant (it does not matter who owns 
what), so that capital structure (and dividend policy) is irrelevant. In addition, no clear picture of the role of financial 
intermediaries in the system is provided. 
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M&M dividend proposition will only hold when q is equal to 1, a condition that in our post-
Keynesian model will be only fulfilled by chance.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on q, with special 
emphasis on the theoretical literature and on the main features of the Cambridge corporate 
models. Section 3 presents a post-Keynesian SFC model and the simulations conducted to 
study its behaviour. Section 4 explains the implications of the post-Keynesian q theory for the 
validity of the M&M dividend proposition. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
1.  Tobin’s q in the neoclassical framework 
Keynes (1936, chp. 12) admitted that ‘the daily revaluations of the stock exchange[...] 
inevitably exert a decisive influence on the rate of current investment. For there is no sense in 
building up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which a similar existing enterprise 
can be purchased [...] if it can be floated off on the Stock Exchange at an immediate profit’ 
(1936, chp. 12). Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969) took up Keynes’s idea in a formal 
model; the latter was an extension of the original Hicks IS-LM model with an LM curve 
depending on a vector of asset prices rather than on a single interest rate, while the former 
was one of the first contributions in dealing with macro models embedded in a rigorous 
accounting structure and can be regarded as an early forerunner of the SFC methodology. 
Another interpretation of Keynes’s idea was offered by Minsky (2008), whose framework is 
similar to Tobin’s in that investment depends on the difference between the demand price and 
the supply price of capital goods.7  
In neoclassical theory, as in Brainard and Tobin’s seminal papers, q plays the main role in 
investment decisions, but uses a more restricted microeconomic rational behaviour setting.8  
This implementation was developed by Lucas & Prescott (1971), Yoshikawa (1980) and Hayashi 
(1982), and since then q has become the ‘preferred theoretical description of investment’ 
(Fischer & Merton, 1984, p.29) in a neoclassical framework and is featured as such in advanced 
textbooks (Carlin & Soskice, 2006; Romer, 2012). One reason for its success is that the model 
can be derived from the maximising behaviour of a single representative firm operating in 
competitive markets and facing adjustment costs. Such adjustment costs can be either internal 
(installation and other costs) or external (new investment induced by a higher level of q bids 
up the price of capital goods), but the workings of the theory are the same in both cases 
(Romer, 2012, p. 408). The relevant q for the neoclassical theory of investment is marginal q, 
                                                          
7 For a discussion of the differences between Minsky and Brainard and Tobin’s framework, see Crotty (1990) and 
Palley (2001). 
8 However, Brainard and Tobin’s framework is quite different from the neoclassical one. As they admit: ‘We are so 
far from being thorough-going neoclassicals that we are quite comfortable in believing that corporate managers […] 
respond to market noise and are in any case sluggish in responding to the arbitrage opportunities of large 
deviations of “q” from par’ (Tobin & Brainard, 1990, p. 548). Furthermore, Tobin (1984, pp. 6–7) expressed serious 
reservations about the ‘efficiency of financial markets’, citing approvingly Keynes’s idea of markets driven by non-
informed, herding behaviour.     
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that is, the ratio of the market value of a marginal unit of capital to its replacement cost.9 The 
equilibrium value for q is 1; if, for whatever reason, the actual value is above that level, wealth-
maximising firms will find profitable investment projects and then will push down the marginal 
efficiency of capital (i.e. the rate of profit), given the assumption of a production function with 
decreasing marginal factor returns.  
There have been several theoretical criticisms to this framework. First, marginal q is an 
unobservable variable, so ‘[t]he managerial investment decision-making process cannot 
possibly be guided by an unobservable variable’ (Crotty, 1990, p. 538, emphasis in the 
original). Second, perfect capital markets are assumed, and shareholders and managers are 
conflated into a single agent (Crotty, 1990). The assumption of perfect capital markets rules 
out the possibility of long periods of time where actual values deviate from fundamentals, so 
managers always receive relevant information from the stock market for their investment 
decisions. The conflation of shareholders with managers implies that firms do not exist in the 
neoclassical framework and that managers as a class do not have different goals from 
shareholders. Third, as Palley (2001, p. 665) notes, if firms and shareholders have different 
expectations about future cash-flows, q equilibrium will be different from unity. Fourth, 
managers will maximise shareholders’ wealth choosing the most appropriate technique for a 
given technology – i.e. the rate of profit is given by a production function. However, it is well-
known that the use of production functions for determining the rate of profit is problematic 
(Cohen & Harcourt, 2003; Felipe & Fisher, 2003; Felipe & McCombie, 2013). 
The empirical evidence for the neoclassical investment function has been quite disappointing 
(Summers, 1981; Abel & Blanchard, 1986; Chirinko, 1993): ‘Their explanatory power is low and 
serial correlation or dynamic structures including the lagged dependent variable are common. 
In addition, other variables [...] are often significant in the equations even though the standard 
formulation of Q models does not provide a satisfactory rationale for their inclusion’ (Blundell 
et al., 1992). Even when the q variable is found to be statistically significant (Blundell et al., 
1992), its economic significance is very low. Furthermore, the adjustment costs estimates 
found in some studies are usually far too large to be reasonable (Summers, 1981). Some of 
these problems stem directly from the theoretical assumptions of the model. For instance, the 
assumption of perfect financial markets, where actual prices cannot deviate from 
fundamentals, does not reflect observed stock market behaviour: ‘Sentiment creates a 
problem for the q model insofar as investment decisions are based on fundamentals’ (Chirinko, 
1993, p. 1889). Another possible source of problems comes from the way capital stock at 
replacement cost is measured, because the perpetual inventory method used can be ‘highly 
inaccurate in the face of major structural shifts’, although it seems that the ‘extant evidence 
provides little support for the capital mismeasurement hypothesis’ (Chirinko, 1993, p. 1890).  
2. Cambridge corporate models 
                                                          
9 Under constant returns on the adjustment costs, it can be shown that marginal and average q coincide (Hayashi, 
1982). Moreover, other influences such as monopoly power, downward-sloping product demand curves and a large 
share of dated capital can produce discrepancies between the marginal and the average q. See Romer (2012, p. 
415). 
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The simplest post-Keynesian long-run macroeconomic model that deals with the 
determination of the business profit rate is the basic dual-class Cambridge model (Kaldor, 
1955; Robinson, 1956; Pasinetti, 1962). In this model, the rate of profit is given by the growth 
rate of investment divided by capitalists’ propensity to consume. In such a framework the main 
results are framed in a distributive context of workers and capitalists. The model has been 
extended to include a government sector (Dalziel, 1991; Pasinetti, 1989; Steedman, 1972), and 
a financial sector (Palley, 1996; Park, 2006).10 
In a strand of this literature launched by Kaldor (1966), this ‘dual-class structure’ was changed 
by a ‘corporate structure’, in which the relevant distinction is no longer between workers and 
capitalists but rather between households and firms.11 This change in the scope of the 
institutional setup was motivated by the criticisms of Samuelson & Modigliani (1966) directed 
towards Pasinetti’s result of workers’ savings irrelevance for the profit rate, and more precisely 
to what they regarded as the assumption of ‘the existence of identifiable classes of capitalists 
and workers with “permanent membership” – even as rough first approximation’ (Samuelson 
& Modigliani, 1966, p. 271). In his rejoinder, Kaldor (1966, p.310) considered the high 
propensity to save out of profits ‘something which attaches to the nature of business income, 
and not to the wealth (or other peculiarities) of the individuals who own property.’  
The change from a dual-class structure to a corporate one was not mere window dressing, but 
had important theoretical implications. In the dual-class model, the adjustment to full-
employment output occurs through the change in the average propensity to save of the 
economy – weighted by workers’ and capitalists’ participation in total savings. For instance, an 
increase in the growth rate raises investment needs, which will be fulfilled through an increase 
in the rate of profit and thus an increase of the profit share in total income. On the other hand, 
in the Cambridge corporate model the adjustment occurs in the stock market: consumption 
has to reach a certain level (through the capital gains component embedded in the 
consumption function) in order to close the gap between full-employment output and 
investment. The valuation ratio plays a crucial role in this process, reconciling corporations’ 
desire for growth and households’ desire to consume. Households’ savings play a buffer role 
here, but now through the volume of capital gains, so the relevant measure making the 
adjustment is households’ comprehensive savings. However, as Davidson (1968, p.259, 
emphasis in the original) pointed out, Kaldor ‘has unwittingly reinstated the deux ex machina 
of the neoclassical system – the rate of interest – as the balancing mechanism, not only for 
maintaining equilibrium in the securities market, but also for ensuring a level of effective 
demand always ample to secure full employment.’12  
                                                          
10 For a thorough review of the Cambridge model literature, see Baranzini & Mirante (2013). 
11 See Moss (1978) for a model with dual-class income distribution analysis in the framework of a corporate 
economy.  
12 The terminology used in the Cambridge literature is misleading. What is labelled ‘the rate of interest’ really is the 
equity yield. In fact, there is neither money nor debt in these models, thus no ‘rate of interest’ in the Keynesian 
sense. The origin of this confusion could be due the neoclassical institutional structure where there are no 
households or firms, but a representative agent, so the difference between the rate of profit and equity yield 
vanishes, because the agent as household will equalise the equity yield to the rate of profit obtained as 
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Therefore, the introduction of the corporate sector adds a high dose of realism to the 
Cambridge model but it also adds a new set of theoretical problems, especially those related 
to corporate behaviour and stock market valuation. It is no wonder that the literature has 
been concerned with the valuation ratio and its relationship with the macroeconomic profit 
rate (Marris, 1972; Moore, 1973, 1975; Lavoie, 1998; Commendatore, 2003). Moreover, this 
corporate framework is in stark contrast to the neoclassical framework. In the later, firms are 
veils, and the production process is a black box – a production function. In contrast, the 
Cambridge corporate model allows for corporations to have their own existence and to make 
decisions independent from households. 
Several propositions can be derived from the basic model: first, there is a negative relation 
between q and growth rates; second, there is a negative relation between q and capital-output 
ratios; and third, there is a positive relationship between q and households’ savings rates.13 
Regarding the profit rate, higher growth rates have a positive effect on profit rates, whereas 
higher retention ratios and higher new share issues have a detrimental effect on the profit 
rate. Finally, higher growth rates have an unequivocal positive effect on the equity yield – both 
through higher profit rates and a lower Tobin’s q. 
The pair of relationships between q and growth rates, and q and savings rates constitutes the 
core of what we call the ‘Kaldorian theory of q’. Despite its simplicity, the model is able to 
explain remarkably well the long-run trend of q in, for instance, the US economy and other 
developed economies during the last 40 years.14 The evidence shows that the recent higher 
level of q (Montier, 2014a; Piketty, 2014, p. 189) has been coupled with lower accumulation 
rates and higher propensities to save, the latter due to income redistribution to the top 
percentile; these effects, inter alia, are usually associated in the post-Keynesian literature with 
the financialisation process (Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008; Van Treeck, 2008). 
Moreover, there is nothing in the Kaldorian theory to preclude q from being persistently 
different from unity. Admittedly, there have been other factors that have undoubtedly played 
a role in the evolution of q, notably the increase in leverage and the change in institutions, 
which are not included in the model. But the evidence taken at face value between growth 
rates, q and savings rates is in principle favourable to the post-Keynesian theory. 
Another remarkable feature of the Kaldorian theory that has gone unnoticed in the post-
Keynesian literature15 is that it reverses the causation compared to neoclassical theory: while 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘entrepreneur’ – the sort of arbitrage game that abounds in the Modigliani-Miller literature. In turn, the rate of 
profit is usually considered in the neoclassical framework to be the rate of interest (as in Solow’s), given in principle 
that all firm’s liabilities can be treated alike. Therefore, in the neoclassical framework, the rate of profit, rate of 
interest and equity yield can be used interchangeably. 
13 Kaldor (1966) assumed that households’ propensity to save was homogenous across all income classes (i.e. 
wages, dividends and capital gains). However, in a model with different propensities to save the link between every 
propensity and the valuation ratio is still positive (Moore 1973, 1975). 
14 Full disclaimer: all these relationships should be properly understood in a long-run context. 
15 See the discussion in the previous section. Post-Keynesians disagree on the neoclassical investment functions 
(those solely with q as an independent variable), on the grounds that the rationality imposed is absurd (e.g. radical 
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mainstream theory predicts a causal link running from q to investment, the Kaldorian theory 
posits a link running from investment to q. While the mainstream theory supports stock 
market booms as drivers of corporate investment (q values higher than one), in the Kaldorian 
theory such a mechanism is assumed to be irrelevant. The Kaldorian theory features the 
Keynesian principle that investment is given by animal spirits, while in the mainstream theory 
investment is given by the production function through the law of the one price – the 
entrepreneur will carefully equalise the marginal efficiency of capital to the marginal 
productivity of capital (rate of profit), the latter given by the production function.  
However, there are other, less favourable features in the basic Kaldorian model. There are 
problems of omission as well as commission. The problem of omission is that Kaldor offers an 
explanation of q based on a model without a proper financial sector. There are not banks, 
there is no money and there is only one financial asset. The problem of commission is in the 
modelling of firms’ financing decisions and dividend policy. Kaldor assumes that a fixed part of 
profits is paid out as dividends and a fixed share of investment is financed by equity issue, 
independent of financial market conditions. However, in the real world, the financing decision 
and the dividend decision are neither independent nor completely fixed regardless of the state 
of capital markets. Moreover, a higher proportion of investment financed through new shares 
should lead to lower valuation ratios – given the higher supply of shares. Finally, one would 
expect that other factors not included in the model (most notably, corporate leverage, 
inflation, and fiscal and monetary policy) to affect the evolution of q. These issues will be 
addressed in the model presented in the next section. 
 
3. A post-Keynesian SFC model for Tobin’s q behaviour 
The Cambridge model allows gleaning very general relationships between q and other 
macroeconomic variables, but at the cost of simplification. The model presented here depicts a 
more sophisticated economic system with post-Keynesian sectoral behaviour. The main post-
Keynesian features are: endogenous money, mark-up pricing, sectors with independent 
motivations (especially households, firms and banks) and a theoretical framework that is 
demand-led. Because the model presented is too large to be solved analytically, simulations 
will be performed to analyse q’s behaviour over time. We are specifically interested in three 
sets of shocks that will allow us to evaluate whether the conclusions of the original Kaldorian 
model still hold: a change in the growth rate of the economy, a change in households’ 
propensity to consume and a change in the willingness of corporations to issue new shares.  
1. The model 
The model consists of 56 equations. The three matrices that lay out the full accounting 
structure of the model (stocks, flows and price revaluations) can be found in the Appendix. 
Except for firms’ financing decisions, no pretension of originality in the behavioural 
assumptions is made; rather, the aim is to set up a model based on established aspects of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
uncertainty and animal spirits) or on the grounds that no quantities (e.g. cash-flows, utilisation) are included. Thus q 
is not a key determinant of investment. Our point is that investment is a determinant of q. 
9 
 
post-Keynesian theory as far as possible. Given the size of the model, only the main 
behavioural equations will be discussed, the full list of equations can be found in the Appendix. 
For the sake of convenience, each sector is discussed separately. 
Firms’ behaviour 
Firms’ behaviour is characterised as follows. Investment grows in real terms at a constant rate, 
𝑔𝑟𝑘, given by Keynesian animal spirits. More complicated investment functions have been 
extensively used in the literature (Dos Santos & Zezza, 2008; Lavoie & Godley, 2001; Van 
Treeck, 2008; Zezza, 2008), but here a simpler form has been preferred.16 Our specification of 
firms’ financing decisions and dividend policy differs substantially from the standard treatment 
of the SFC literature (Godley & Lavoie, 2007; Dos Santos & Zezza, 2008; Le Heron & Mouakil, 
2008; Van Treeck, 2008), which typically assumes that a fixed percentage of investment is 
financed through new share issues, regardless of financial market conditions, and that 
dividend policy is a fixed percentage of total profits. In other words, dividend policy is 
considered to be independent of investment financing decisions. We regard both assumptions 
as problematic and follow Gordon’s (1994) investment financing and dividend theory instead. 
In Gordon’s framework, the sale of shares is a supplement, and not a substitute for retained 
earnings in investment financing decisions; dividend policy is regarded as subordinate to 
investment policy and one cannot be varied independently of the other. At the mathematical 
level, firms’ financing decisions are modelled here very much in the manner of Tobinesque 
households’ portfolio decisions: the share of every financing method (retained profits, debt 
and equity issues) will depend on the interest rate on loans, on the share price in the stock 
market and on the degree of leverage. The relative equity price is modelled using the price-
earnings ratio (using the trailing twelve months earnings), 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚, so firms will opt for equity 
issues and retained earnings when this ratio is high and shares are expensive. Once the share 
of retained profits is given by equation (2), firms will distribute the excess over retained profits 
as dividends (equation 5), so dividends will vary depending on financing decisions. Finally, 
equation (6) depicts firms’ price policy decision as a mark-up over the unit costs of the 
previous period. 
 𝑖 = 𝑘−1. 𝑔𝑟𝑘 (1) 
 𝛱𝑟
𝑓 =  𝐼𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 . 𝛥𝑒𝑓 − 𝛥𝐿𝑑 (2) 
 
∆𝐿𝑑
𝐼
=  𝑓20 + 𝑓21. 𝑟𝑙−1 + 𝑓22.
1
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚−1
+ 𝑓23. (
𝐿
𝐾
)
−1
 (3) 
 
𝑝𝑒 . ∆𝑒𝑓
𝐼
=  𝑓30 + 𝑓31. 𝑟𝑙−1 + 𝑓32.
1
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚−1
+ 𝑓33. (
𝐿
𝐾
)
−1
 (4) 
 𝛱𝑑
𝑓 =  𝛱𝑓 − 𝛱𝑟
𝑓 (5) 
 𝑝 = (1 + 𝜑). 𝑈𝐶−1 (6) 
Inflation 
                                                          
16 For the post-Keynesian debate on investment functions, see Hein et al. (2011), Hein et al. (2012) and Lavoie 
(2014, chap. 6).  
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The labour market follows mainly Godley & Lavoie (2007, chp. 9, 10, 11): equation (7) says that 
unions have a desired, targeted real wage that is a function of the previous target level, labour 
productivity and the rate of employment. Labour population, 𝑁𝑓𝑒, is assumed to be fixed and 
does not grow. On the other hand, equation (8) depicts the part of the negotiation process 
that is included into the nominal wage rate of the current period. Overall, our labour market is 
different from Kaldor’s, because it allows for the possibility of unemployment in the long-run 
and because growth in labour population here is zero. However, our model is similar in spirit to 
the Kaldorian theory of income distribution because wage bargaining is nominal and real 
wages will adjust in the long run. Finally, equation (9) deals with labour productivity: following 
Zezza (2008), it is assumed that productivity grows at an exogenous rate, 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟0, minus a 
parameter that reflects that higher levels of capacity utilization will lead to lower levels of 
productivity growth. 
 𝜔𝑇 = (
𝑊
𝑃
)
𝑇
= 𝜔−1
𝑇 . [1 + 𝛺0 + 𝛺1.
𝑝𝑟−1
𝜔−1
𝑇 + 𝛺2. (
𝑁
𝑁𝑓𝑒
)
−1
] (7) 
 𝑊 = 𝑊−1. [1 + 𝛺3. (
𝜔−1
𝑇
𝑤−1
)] (8) 
 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟 = 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟0 − 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟1. 𝑢 (9) 
Households’ behaviour 
The most important household decisions are regarding consumption and their portfolio 
allocation. Equation (10) says that households’ consumption decisions are assumed to be in 
real terms, depending on expected real disposable income and one-period-lagged real wealth. 
Equation (11) shows how to calculate the deflated value for disposable income.17 Households’ 
portfolio decision is a two-step process: in the first round (equation 12), households will decide 
how much wealth to allocate as deposits, and in the second round households will decide how 
to allocate the rest between equities and bills following Tobinesque principles: households will 
have some previous preferences for such allocation (parameters 𝜆10 and 𝜆20), which will be 
modulated by the equity yield and the rate of bills of the previous period.  
 𝑐 = 𝛼1. 𝑦𝑑
𝑒 + 𝛼2. 𝑣ℎ−1 (10) 
 𝑦𝑑 =
𝑌𝐷
𝑝
−
𝜋. 𝑉ℎ−1
𝑝
 (11) 
 𝐷ℎ = 𝜎. 𝑉ℎ (12) 
 
𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ
𝑉ℎ − 𝐷ℎ
= 𝜆10 + 𝜆11. 𝛾−1 + 𝜆12. 𝑟𝑏−1 (13) 
 𝐵ℎ = 𝑉ℎ − 𝐷ℎ − 𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ (14) 
Banks, government’s behaviour and financial markets 
                                                          
17 Real disposable income is not simply the deflated value of nominal disposable income, but has to be adjusted for 
the erosion in wealth produced by inflation. For a formal proof, see Godley & Lavoie (2007, pp.293-294). 
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Turning to banks, government, central bank and financial markets, equation (15) states the 
very well-known post-Keynesian principle that in credit-based economies money is 
endogenous and largely the result of commercial banks’ decisions. Equations (16) and (17) 
determine banks’ profits as the amount of interest payments of the current period and banks’ 
dividend decisions, which distribute all their profits to households. This decision, together with 
that of setting the interest rate on loans (equation 18), are the only decisions that banks in this 
model can autonomously take. Equations (18) to (22) depict government and central bank 
decisions. Government decides on the growth of government expenditures based on the level 
of its debt in real terms as a share of real income and on the level of the unemployment in the 
economy. The former depicts the extent to which the government has public debt target while 
the latter indicates the strength of anti-cyclical fiscal measures.  Equation (21) says that the 
central bank is a residual buyer of government’s debt and (22) is central bank’s monetary 
policy decision – deciding the level of the interest rate on bills. 
Finally, equations (23) to (25) are simply definitions of well-known financial ratios: Tobin’s q, 
price-earnings ratio and equity yield, respectively. The price-earnings ratio in equation (24) 
anchors on the trailing-twelve-months corporate earnings. Finally, equation (25) is the 
common definition of the equity yield. 
 ∆𝐿𝑠 = ∆𝐿𝑑 (15) 
 𝛱𝑏 = 𝑟𝑙−1. 𝐿𝑠−1 (16) 
 𝛱𝑑
𝑏 = 𝛱𝑏 (17) 
 𝑟𝑙 = 𝑟?̅?  (18) 
 𝑔 = 𝑔−1. (1 + 𝑔𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣) (19) 
 𝑔𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑔𝑟0 − 𝑔𝑟1. (
𝐵
𝑝
𝑦
)
−1
+ 𝑔𝑟2. (1 −
𝑁
𝑁𝑓𝑒
)
−1
 (20) 
 𝛥𝐵𝑐𝑏 = 𝛥𝐵 − 𝛥𝐵ℎ (21) 
 𝑟𝑏 = 𝑟?̅? (22) 
 𝑞 =
𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ + 𝐿𝑑
𝐾
 (23) 
 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚 =
𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ
𝛱𝑓
 (24) 
 𝛾 =
𝛱𝑑
𝑓 + 𝐶𝐺
𝑝𝑒−1. 𝑒ℎ−1
 (25) 
As usual in a SFC model, a ‘redundant equation’ is left:  an accounting identity is implied in the 
set of logical relations with variables already explained in some other equation. This equation 
says that Central Bank’s high-powered money is equal to banks’ reserves:  
 𝐻𝑏 = 𝐻𝑐𝑏  
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The only price-equilibrating mechanism in the model takes place in the equity market, where 
the equity price fluctuates to accommodate the equity supply (given by firms and households 
who wish to sell their shares) with the equity demand (given by households who wish to buy 
shares). 
 
2. Simulations 
An increase in the growth rate of the economy 
The first simulation will deal with an increase in the growth rate of the capital stock, 𝑔𝑟𝑘, 
which from a Keynesian point of view can be regarded as an increase in animal spirits. Figures 
1 to 4 show the results. The first chart confirms the Kaldorian conclusion that higher growth 
rates yield lower valuation ratios. However, not much attention should be placed in this case 
to short-term results, given the way financial markets have been introduced in the picture, 
because one should expect that financial markets should include higher growth rate 
expectations into equity prices in the short-run – the empirical evidence suggests that markets 
almost always overreact. In any case, the secular decline in the long-run can be explained by 
the increase in the inflation rate, which affects not only financial market indicators but 
corporations’ return on equity as well, through higher values of capital at replacement cost. 
This result is in contrast to the Cambridge model, where higher growth rates lead to higher 
profit rates. Here, although economic activity improves (both in the short-run and in the long-
run), the fact that the return on equity is measured with capital in nominal values (as it should) 
leads to a decline of the return on equity over time. 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. First simulation: increase in animal spirits, grk  
 
Figure 1b. First simulation: increase in animal spirits, grk  
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Figure 1c. First simulation: increase in animal spirits, grk  
 
Figure 1d. First simulation: increase in animal spirits, grk  
 
 
An increase in the propensity to consume out of wealth 
Our second simulation will deal with another parameter of the Cambridge corporate model, a 
change in the propensity to consume out of wealth. Figures 5 to 8 shows the implications of an 
increase in this parameter. This increase has the expected Keynesian results affecting 
positively consumption and disposable income – both in the short and in the long-run. The 
unemployment rate improves due to higher levels of income and firms enjoy a higher level of 
profitability as well. This is in contrast to the Kaldorian model, where households’ behaviour 
does not have any impact on the long-run profit rate. However, higher levels of consumption 
are balanced with lower levels of real wealth, which provoke the sale of shares and a fall in 
stock market valuations, confirming the negative relationship between propensities to 
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consume and valuation ratios. Higher levels of inflation push up the replacement cost of fixed 
capital and contribute additionally to the fall in q. Although the equity yield improves both in 
the short and in the long-run (higher dividend yields are the result of both higher profits and 
lower equity prices), which creates a rebalancing effect in households’ portfolio towards 
equities (increasing then their price), this effect is not enough to compensate for households’ 
desire to reduce their wealth level relative to their income. 
Figure 2a.  Second simulation: increase in the propensity to consume out of wealth, α2  
 
Figure 2b.  Second simulation: increase in the propensity to consume out of wealth, α2  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2c.  Second simulation: increase in the propensity to consume out of wealth, α2  
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Figure 2d.  Second simulation: increase in the propensity to consume out of wealth, α2  
 
 
 
A decrease in the proportion of new share issuance 
The third simulation will deal with a change in the policy of new share issues. Figures 9 to 12 
summarises the main effects of a permanent reduction in the proportion of investment 
financed out of new issues. Given the reduction in the supply of shares, the valuation metrics 
increase notably in the short run and they keep increasing in the long-run. The Kaldorian 
model suggested that firms’ financing policy should not have any long-run effect on q, but here 
that is not the case. The increase in valuation metrics has negative effects on the equity yield, 
given that shareholders have to buy the same assets at higher prices. In turn, a lower equity 
yield leads to a lower share of equities in households’ portfolio. Finally, the way investment is 
financed matters for aggregate output: the last chart shows that unemployment is higher both 
in the short and in the long-run, which impact on corporate profitability through lower levels 
of return on equity. This effect is the opposite expected by the Cambridge model, where lower 
levels of share issuance should lead to an increase in the profit rate. However, the 
unemployment rate here is not fixed and matters for the level of profitability. This simulation 
can be conceptually thought as an increase in the degree of ‘financialisation’ (Stockhammer, 
2004; Orhangazi, 2008), and the results track the main predictions of the literature: higher 
valuation ratios in the new steady-state and lower levels of output and employment. An 
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additional feature could be added: lower levels of shareholder profitability, because of higher 
stock market valuations.18 
Summing up, in our SFC post-Keynesian q model we confirm two of the insights of Kaldor’s 
original model: higher growth rates and higher propensities to consume lead to lower levels of 
q. However, our richer model with an explicit financial sector and treatment of firms’ financing 
decisions (that regards investment and financing decisions of firms as interdependent) does 
find that share issuance affects q. Unsurprisingly, in our model firms’ investment decisions 
affect output, employment and income distribution. Thus, one of the key features of our 
model is that firms influence q through investment decisions as well as through their financing 
policy. Finally, as in Kaldor’s, q does not tend to 1 even in the long-run, so accumulation can 
proceed persistently above or below that level. 
Figure 3a.  Third simulation: decrease in new share issuance, f30  
 
Figure 3b.  Third simulation: decrease in new share issuance, f30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Montier (2014b) presents additional evidence against shareholder value maximisation, showing how equity 
returns were higher in the period 1940-1990 than since then. 
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Figure 3c.  Third simulation: decrease in new share issuance, f30  
 
Figure 3d.  Third simulation: decrease in new share issuance, f30  
 
 
 
4. Post-Keynesian q and the M&M dividend irrelevance proposition 
Our post-Keynesian model and its findings for q are at variance with those of neoclassical 
theory. There, households and firms are mixed (so firms’ decisions as such do not exist) and a 
single representative rational agent takes their place. While in the post-Keynesian tradition 
investment is driven by animal spirits and quantity-variables (e.g. capacity utilization or 
output), in the neoclassical framework all that is needed is the (unobservable) marginal q. The 
fulfilment of this maximising rule will assure that in equilibrium q will be 1 and that any 
discrepancy from this level will be corrected by individual agents adjusting their capital stocks. 
On the other hand, the previous section suggests that in a post-Keynesian model the condition 
of q to be equal to 1 in the long-run will be only fulfilled by chance, given that no equilibrium 
mechanism exists in the model to bring q back to unity; firms take their investment, dividend 
and financing decisions not solely having in mind equity prices (as in the neoclassical model),19 
and the behaviour of the rest of the sectors taken together does not guarantee that q should 
                                                          
19 Moreover, there is nothing in our model (or in the post-Keynesian tradition) that suggests that equity prices only 
incorporate the relevant information for managers so as they can make ‘rational’ investment decisions. In other 
words, no efficient market hypothesis is assumed here.  
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converge to 1. We are going to show that the implications of this non-convergence for the 
Miller & Modigliani (M&M) dividend irrelevance proposition are profound. 
The M&M dividend irrelevance proposition was first put forward by Miller & Modigliani (1961) 
as a companion to the capital structure irrelevance proposition presented three years before 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958). The M&M dividend proposition states that the value of a company 
is independent of its dividend policy. Intuitively, the reason is as follows: an individual investor, 
given its portfolio constraints and risk-return objectives, will be indifferent between receiving 
cash-flows as dividends or as capital gains and, moreover, he will be able to undo corporate 
decisions by creating ‘home-made’ dividends. This arbitrage argument is no different in 
essence to the one proposed by M&M for corporate financial structure irrelevance: there, 
personal leverage was supposed to be a perfect substitute for corporate leverage, so if there 
were an ‘undesired’ change in the corporate financial structure policy, the investor could still 
borrow or lend to attain his portfolio risk-return objectives again and ‘undo’ corporate 
decisions. 
The conventional critiques of the M&M are well known.20 Instead of rehearsing them, we 
want to focus on what happens to the M&M proposition when q is different from unity. The 
M&M dividend proposition and q can be linked through a valuation formula which says that, in 
equilibrium, q can be expressed as a function of the rate of profit (return on equity here), 𝑟, 
the equity yield, 𝛾, and the growth rate of the economy, 𝑔.21 The equation is as follows: 
𝑞 =
𝑟 − 𝑔
𝑦 − 𝑔
 
Only in the case 𝑟 = 𝑦, then q will be one. It turns out that the effect of dividend policy on 
company valuation depends on the values taken by 𝑟 and 𝑦. Table 4 shows the valuation of a 
hypothetical common share under four different scenarios.22   
 
                                                          
20 Most of them are based on market imperfections, among others: different tax rates for dividends and capital 
gains, asymmetric information (managers may want to signal corporate prospects through dividend policy) and 
other corporate imperfections such as inefficient managers who may squander cash – making it preferable to pay 
out dividends. Recently, experiments in the behavioural finance literature have shown that individuals pay attention 
to the source from which they receive income, engaging in mental accounting (Thaler, 1990, 1999): the way an 
investor receives his income matters. Finally, the M&M proposition, which is an argument derived from micro-
conditions, may not necessarily be applicable at a macro level, due to well-known fallacy of composition problems 
(Taylor, 2004; King, 2012). For additional critiques of the M&M framework, see Gordon (1992, 1994), Glickman 
(1997), Pasinetti (2012) and Wood (2013). 
21 A precision has to be made. For convenience, the q used in this section and computed with this formula is the 
‘equity q’ – i.e. market value of equity to its replacement cost (assets net of debt). The equity q (or ‘leveraged q’) is 
related to the traditional q in the following way: 𝑞𝑒 =
𝑞−𝑙
1−𝑙
, where 𝑙 is the leverage ratio (debt to total assets). As one 
would expect, when q is equal to 1, then equity q will be equal to 1 as well. Therefore, for the M&M discussion and 
its validity when q is different from 1, it does not matter to use the traditional q or the equity q.    
22 The example is taken from Penman (2011, ch. 2), but modified and adapted for our purposes. However, Penman 
does not explicitly discuss the case when 𝑟 ≠ 𝛾. The technical details of the four scenarios can be found in Appendix 
II. 
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Table 4. Summary of valuations under different scenarios 
  
Table 4 shows that dividend policy is irrelevant only when the rate of profit (return on equity) 
is equal to the equity yield or, in other words, when q is equal to 1: in this case, the pay-out 
ratio chosen by the firm does not matter, because the value of the enterprise will remain 
constant. However, this is not the case when the previous equality does not hold and q is 
different from 1: changes in pay-out ratios will affect the value of the company,23 because the 
difference between 𝑟 and 𝛾 makes that dividends and capital gains are not any longer in the 
same footing. In the first two scenarios, the value remains the same because it is financially 
equivalent to receive dividends and reinvest them at the market rate than to accumulate 
unrealised capital gains (through higher equity prices) because of higher retained profits. 
However, in the other two cases, the rate of return is higher than the equity yield, so the 
investor is better off if the company decides to reinvest the earnings rather than to distribute 
them as dividends – i.e. the investor would obtain a lower reinvestment rate in the market in 
the latter case.  
Therefore, from an empirical standpoint, as long as q is not equal to unity the M&M dividend 
irrelevance proposition will not hold, because dividends and unrealised capital gains cannot be 
treated as financially alike. An empirical analysis of q is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
suffice it to say that the historical evidence in the developed countries since 1950 shows that q 
has been persistently different from 1 – and trending up or down for whole decades. This is 
crucial empirical evidence for the relevance of corporations’ dividend decisions on equity 
valuations.      
 
                                                          
23 For brevity’s sake, only the case when 𝑟 > 𝛾 is considered here.  
Book value per share 100
Return on equity [r] 7.0%
Equity yield [γ], scenarios 1 and 2 7.0%
Equity yield [γ], scenarios 3 and 4 6.0%
1 2 3 4
Nil pay-out, r = γ Full pay-out, r = γ Half pay-out, r > γ Full pay-out, r > γ
Book value [1] 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Discounted residual earnings [2] - - 40.0 16.7
Total value [1+2=3] 100.0 100.0 140.0 116.7
Price to book (Equity q) [3/1] 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.17
Scenario
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5. Conclusions 
The present essay has proposed a post-Keynesian q theory at the macroeconomic level based 
on Kaldor’s (1966) seminal paper. The Kaldorian model provides two important 
macroeconomic long-run relationships, between q and the growth rate of the economy and q 
and propensities to consume. We claim that these relationships alone can provide new 
valuable insights on long-run relationships between financial (equity) markets and 
macroeconomics. Our medium-scale SFC post-Keynesian model has improved the simplistic 
monetary and financial framework of the Kaldorian model and has shown that in this enriched 
setup these two long-run relationships still hold. Our model has also addressed, following 
Gordon (1992), the interdependence between firms’ financing decisions and dividend policy, 
and aspect often overlooked but crucial for the understanding of financial markets. On the 
other hand, our model does find that share issuance (and more generally, firms’ financing 
decisions) affects q, whereas in the Kaldorian model q was independent of firms’ financing 
policy. Furthermore, the Kaldorian insight that, in general, q will be different from 1 in the long 
run, is confirmed by the numerical simulations. Independent sectors with different motivations 
make possible that accumulation can proceed with q levels different from unity. 
Finally, this non-convergence impinges on the validity of the Miller-Modigliani dividend 
irrelevance proposition. As long as q is different from 1, the proposition does not hold, 
because in this case capital gains and dividends cannot be considered financially equivalent, so 
firms’ dividend policy will affect equity valuation. The empirical evidence is against the M&M 
proposition. Economic theory should consider a q different from 1 as part of the financial 
markets stylized facts. Post-Keynesian macroeconomic theory can explain this, even in the 
absence of speculation or other persistent behavioural biases. 
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Appendix I. List of equations of the model, values used in the simulations and matrices of the 
model 
List of equations 
𝑖 = 𝑘−1. 𝑔𝑟𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (1) 
𝛱𝑟
𝑓 =  𝐼𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 . 𝛥𝑒𝑓 − 𝛥𝐿𝑑  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
′𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 (2) 
𝛱𝑟
𝑓
𝐼
=  𝑓10 + 𝑓11. 𝑟𝑙−1 + 𝑓12.
1
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚−1
+ 𝑓13. (
𝐿
𝐾
)
−1
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 
(2𝑎) 
∆𝐿𝑑
𝐼
=  𝑓20 + 𝑓21. 𝑟𝑙−1 + 𝑓22.
1
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚−1
+ 𝑓23. (
𝐿
𝐾
)
−1
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 
(3) 
𝑝𝑒 . ∆𝑒𝑓
𝐼
=  𝑓30 + 𝑓31. 𝑟𝑙−1
+ 𝑓32.
1
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚−1
+ 𝑓33. (
𝐿
𝐾
)
−1
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
(4) 
𝛱𝑑
𝑓 =  𝛱𝑓 − 𝛱𝑟
𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠′𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 (5) 
𝑝 = (1 + 𝜑). 𝑈𝐶−1 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (6) 
𝜔𝑇 = (
𝑊
𝑃
)
𝑇
= 𝜔−1
𝑇 . [1 + 𝛺0
+ 𝛺1.
𝑝𝑟−1
𝜔−1
𝑇
+ 𝛺2. (
𝑁
𝑁𝑓𝑒
)
−1
] 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 (7) 
𝑊 = 𝑊−1. [1 + 𝛺3. (
𝜔−1
𝑇
𝑤−1
)] 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 (8) 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟 = 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟0 − 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟1. 𝑢 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (9) 
𝑐 = 𝛼1. 𝑦𝑑
𝑒 + 𝛼2. 𝑣ℎ−1 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (10) 
𝑦𝑑 =
𝑌𝐷
𝑝
−
𝜋. 𝑉ℎ−1
𝑝
 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (11) 
𝐷ℎ = 𝜎. 𝑉ℎ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (12) 
𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ
𝑉ℎ − 𝐷ℎ
= 𝜆10 + 𝜆11. 𝛾−1 + 𝜆12. 𝑟𝑏−1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (13) 
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𝐵ℎ = 𝑉ℎ − 𝐷ℎ − 𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (14) 
𝐵ℎ
𝑉ℎ − 𝐷ℎ
= 𝜆20 + 𝜆21. 𝛾−1 + 𝜆22. 𝑟𝑏−1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (14𝑎) 
∆𝐿𝑠 = ∆𝐿𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 (15) 
𝛱𝑏 = 𝑟𝑙−1. 𝐿𝑠−1 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
′𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 (16) 
𝛱𝑑
𝑏 = 𝛱𝑏 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠′𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 (17) 
𝑟𝑙 = 𝑟?̅?  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 (18) 
𝑔 = 𝑔−1. (1 + 𝑔𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣) 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (19) 
𝑔𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑔𝑟0 − 𝑔𝑟1. (
𝐵
𝑝
𝑦
)
−1
+ 𝑔𝑟2. (1 −
𝑁
𝑁𝑓𝑒
)
−1
 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (20) 
𝛥𝐵𝑐𝑏 = 𝛥𝐵 − 𝛥𝐵ℎ  𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 (21) 
𝑟𝑏 = 𝑟?̅? 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 (22) 
𝑞 =
𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ + 𝐿𝑑
𝐾
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑞
− 𝐾𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑜𝑟′𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
(23) 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚 =
𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ
𝛱𝑓
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (24) 
𝛾 =
𝛱𝑑
𝑓 + 𝐶𝐺
𝑝𝑒−1. 𝑒ℎ−1
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 (25) 
𝐶𝑠  =  𝐶𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 (26) 
𝐼𝑠  =  𝐼𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 (27) 
𝐺𝑠  =  𝐺𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 (28) 
𝑊𝐵𝑠  =  𝑊𝐵𝑑  𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 (29) 
𝑇𝑑 = 𝑇𝑠
ℎ + 𝑇𝑠
𝑓
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 (30) 
𝑌 =  𝐶𝑠 + 𝐼𝑠 + 𝐺𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 (31) 
𝑌𝐷 = 𝑊𝐵𝑑 + 𝛱𝑑
𝑓 + 𝛱𝑑
𝑏
+ (𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵ℎ−1) − 𝑇𝑠
ℎ 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠′𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (32) 
𝑦 = 𝑐 + 𝑖 + 𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 (33) 
𝐾 = 𝑘. 𝑝 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 (34) 
𝑘 = 𝑘−1 + 𝑖 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 (35) 
𝐼𝑑 = 𝑖. 𝑝 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (36) 
𝛱𝑟
𝑓 =  𝐼𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒 . 𝛥𝑒𝑓 − 𝛥𝐿𝑑  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
′𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 (37) 
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𝛱𝑑
𝑓 =  𝛱𝑓 − 𝛱𝑟
𝑓
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠′𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 (38) 
𝑇𝑠
𝑓 = 𝜃𝑓 . [𝑌 − 𝑊𝐵𝑑 − (𝑟𝑙−1. 𝐿𝑑−1)] 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 (39) 
𝑈𝐶 =
𝑊𝐵𝑑
𝑦
 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (40) 
𝑊𝐵𝑑 = 𝑁. 𝑊 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 (41) 
𝜋 =
(𝑝 − 𝑝−1)
𝑝−1
 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (42) 
𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟−1. (1 + 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟) 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (43) 
𝑢 =
𝑦
𝑘−1
 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (44) 
𝑁 =
𝑦
𝑝𝑟
 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 (45) 
∆𝑉ℎ =  𝑌𝐷 − 𝐶𝑑 + 𝐶𝐺 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠
′𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (46) 
𝑇𝑠
ℎ = 𝜃ℎ . [𝑊𝐵𝑑 + 𝛱𝑑
𝑓 + 𝛱𝑑
𝑏
+ (𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵ℎ−1)] 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 (47) 
𝐶𝑑 = 𝑐. 𝑝 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (48) 
𝑦𝑑𝑒 = 𝑦𝑑−1. (1 + 𝑔𝑟𝑘) 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (49) 
𝑣ℎ =
𝑉ℎ
𝑝
 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (50) 
𝛥𝐷𝑑 = 𝛥𝐷ℎ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
′𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 (51) 
𝛥𝐻𝑏 = 𝛥𝐷𝑑 − ∆𝐿𝑠 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
′𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (52) 
𝐺𝑑 = 𝑔. 𝑝 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (53) 
∆𝐵 =  (𝐺𝑑 + 𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵−1)
− (𝑇𝑑 + 𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏−1) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (54) 
𝛥𝐻𝑐𝑏  =  𝛥𝐵𝑐𝑏 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘
′𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (55) 
𝐶𝐺 = 𝑒−1. (𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒−1) 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 (56) 
𝐻𝑏 = 𝐻𝑐𝑏  (𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡) 
 
List of parameter values 
𝑔𝑟𝑘 = 0.0294 𝜃ℎ = 0.236 𝛼2 = 0.02 
𝑓20 = 0.125 𝜑 = 0.32 𝜎 = 0.4 
𝑓21 = −13.1 𝛺0 = 0.003 𝜆10 = 0.5 
𝑓22 = 15.1 𝛺1 = 0.0110 𝜆11 = 4 
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𝑓23 = −2 𝛺2 = 0.0150 𝜆12 = −4 
𝑓30 = 0.1 𝛺3 = 0.046 𝑔𝑟0 = 0.035 
𝑓31 = 3.5 𝑁𝑓𝑒 = 1.1 𝑔𝑟1 = 0.01 
𝑓32 = −5 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟0 = 0.031 𝑔𝑟2 = 0.012 
𝑓33 = 1.5 𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟1 = 0.005 𝑟𝑙 = 0.035 
𝜃𝑓 = 0.27 𝛼1 = 0.85 𝑟𝑏 = 0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Balance-sheet matrix  
Balance-sheet Households Firms Banks Government 
Central 
Bank 
∑ 
Real capital  +𝐾    +𝐾 
Equities +𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ     +𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ 
Reserves (HPM)   +𝐻𝑏  −𝐻𝑐𝑏 0 
Bills +𝐵ℎ   −𝐵 +𝐵𝑐𝑏 0 
Deposits +𝐷ℎ  −𝐷𝑑   0 
Loans  −𝐿𝑑 +𝐿𝑠   0 
Net worth −𝑉ℎ −𝑉𝑓 − +𝑉𝑔 − −(𝑉ℎ + 𝑉𝑓 − 𝑉𝑔) 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table 2. Revaluation matrix  
Revaluation 
matrix 
Households Firms Banks Government 
Central 
Bank 
∑ 
Real capital  +∆𝑝. 𝑘−1    +∆𝑝. 𝑘−1 
Equities +∆𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ−1     +∆𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ−1 
∑ +∆𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ−1 +∆𝑝. 𝑘−1 0 0 0 
+(∆𝑝𝑒 . 𝑒ℎ−1
+ ∆𝑝. 𝑘−1) 
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Table 3. Transaction-flow matrix  
Transactions-flow matrix  Households 
Firms Banks 
Government 
 Central Bank  
∑ 
Current Capital Current Capital  Current Capital  
Consumption  −𝐶𝑑 +𝐶𝑠         0 
Investment   +𝐼𝑠 −𝐼𝑑        0 
Government 
expenditures 
  +𝐺𝑠    −𝐺𝑑     0 
GDP [memo]   [𝑌]         0 
Wages  +𝑊𝐵𝑠 −𝑊𝐵𝑑         0 
Firms’ profits after tax  +𝛱𝑑
𝑓
 −𝛱𝑓 +𝛱𝑟
𝑓
        0 
Taxes  −𝑇𝑠
ℎ −𝑇𝑠
𝑓
    +𝑇𝑑     0 
Interest on loans   −𝑟𝑙−1. 𝐿𝑑−1  +𝑟𝑙−1. 𝐿𝑠−1       0 
Banks’ profits  +𝛱𝑑
𝑏   −𝛱𝑏       0 
Interest on bills  +𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵ℎ−1     −𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵−1  +𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏−1   0 
Central Bank profits       +𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏−1  −𝑟𝑏−1. 𝐵𝑐𝑏−1   0 
Change in reserves      −𝛥𝐻𝑏    +𝛥𝐻𝑐𝑏  0 
Change in equities  −𝑝𝑒 . 𝛥𝑒ℎ  +𝑝𝑒 . 𝛥𝑒𝑓        0 
Change in bills  −𝛥𝐵ℎ     +𝛥𝐵   −𝛥𝐵𝑐𝑏  0 
Change in deposits  −𝛥𝐷ℎ    +𝛥𝐷𝑑      0 
Change in loans    +𝛥𝐿𝑑  −𝛥𝐿𝑠      0 
∑  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0 
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Appendix II. Equity valuation scenarios for the M&M theorem 
The main assumptions for our equity valuation exercise are as follows.  
In order to value the stock, a method of residual earnings is used, given that in one scenario 
the pay-out is zero, so a Gordon-dividend model (Gordon & Shapiro, 1956) would not perform 
the task, given that there are no dividends to discount. In the residual earnings method, the 
value of a stock is the sum of current book value plus future discounted residual earnings, 
which are defined as the difference between the return on equity, 𝑟, and the equity yield, 𝛾, 
times previous period book value (Penman, 2011). Because the firm in question is an ongoing 
concern, a terminal value has to be added in order to take into account the part of value 
accruing in the distant future; for such terminal value, a formula for continuous compounding 
growth is applied. In any case, it is important to note that the residual earnings valuation 
model is financially equivalent to the sum of the discounted book value, plus the discount 
value of dividends in the projected horizon plus the value of discounted residual earnings 
beyond the projected horizon. The tables below show that both methods yield the same 
results. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that future earnings are known with certainty. It is not implied 
whatsoever that in the real world equity analysts face such an easy task, but rather it is a 
useful device for assessing a stock’s intrinsic value – the common assumption in the M&M 
literature. Book value is equity at historic cost in the balance sheet. The difference between 
earnings and dividends in every period cumulates into the book value figure. The return on 
equity, the level of current earnings divided by the book value of the previous period, is 7%, 
and is equal to the equity yield in the first two scenarios – in the other two scenarios the 
equity yield is lower than the return on equity. 
Table 5 reports the first two valuation scenarios. The first scenario assumes a valuation with a 
nil pay-out ratio. Starting with a book value of 100, this book value will be increased through 
retained earnings. Although the book value increases every year, residual earnings are every 
year zero (because of the assumption 𝑟 = 𝛾), so that the value of this stock is simply the book 
value. On the other hand, the second scenario is assumed that dividends are paid in full. In 
such a case, the book value remains flat sine die because dividends flow out of the company. It 
can be seen that dividend policy in both scenarios does not matter, because the value of the 
company remains unchanged. 
Table 6 shows a similar story but now for 𝑟 ≠ 𝛾. It can be seen that in this case dividend policy 
matters, because the value of the company is affected by the change in dividend policy – from 
a value of 116.7 with a full pay-out ratio to a value of 140 with 50% as a pay-out ratio). 
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Table 5. Value of the stock under the assumption r = γ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pay-out ratio 0%
Equity yield [γ] 7%
Return on equity [r] 7%
1 2 3 4 5
Earnings 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.6
Residual earnings (RE) - - - -
% in residual earnings - - - -
Dividends - - - -
Book value 100.0 107.0 114.5 122.5 131.1
Value 100.0
Book value 100.0
Discounted RE 2015 -
Discounted RE 2016 -
Discounted RE 2017 -
Discounted RE 2018 -
Terminal value -
Book value discounted 100.0
Dividends discounted - - - -
Value 100.0
Pay-out ratio 100%
Required return [γ] 7%
Return on equity [r] 7%
1 2 3 4 5
Earnings 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Residual earnings (RE) - - - -
% in residual earnings - - - -
Dividends 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Book value 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Value 100.0
Book value 100.0
Discounted RE 2015 -
Discounted RE 2016 -
Discounted RE 2017 -
Discounted RE 2018 -
Terminal value -
Book value discounted 76.3
Dividends discounted 6.5 6.1 5.7 5.3
Value 100.0
32 
 
 
 
Table 6. Value of the stock under the assumption r ≠ γ 
 
Pay-out ratio 50%
Equity yield [γ] 6%
Return on equity [r] 7%
1 2 3 4 5
Earnings 7.0 7.2 7.5 7.8
Residual earnings (RE) 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
% in residual earnings - 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
Dividends 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9
Book value 100.0 103.5 107.1 110.9 114.8
Value 140.0
Book value 100.0
Discounted RE 2015 0.9
Discounted RE 2016 0.9
Discounted RE 2017 0.9
Discounted RE 2018 0.9
Terminal value 36.4
Book value discounted 90.9
Dividends discounted 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1
Residual earnings discounted 36.4
Value 140.0
Pay-out ratio 100%
Required return [γ] 6%
Return on equity [r] 7%
1 2 3 4 5
Earnings 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Residual earnings (RE) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
% in residual earnings - - - -
Dividends 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Book value 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Value 116.7
Book value 100.0
Discounted RE 2015 0.9
Discounted RE 2016 0.9
Discounted RE 2017 0.8
Discounted RE 2018 0.8
Terminal value 13.2
Book value discounted 79.2
Dividends discounted 6.6 6.2 5.9 5.5
Residual earnings discounted 13.2
Value 116.7
